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Abstract 
We investigate several fragments of multiplicative linear logic, in a natural deduction setting 
and with the aim of a better understanding of the par connective. We study, first, a pre-tensorial 
calculus, which is strengthened then in the standard tensorial fragment. The addition of a further 
pre-tensorial connective yields (a natural deduction version of) Full Intuitionistic Linear Logic. 
A further strengthening of the rules leads to the full classical multiplicative logic. Some proof- 
theoretical properties of the systems are investigated. 
1. Introduction 
This study emerges as an attempt to better understand the “par” connective of linear 
logic, in its logical and computational content, from a computer science perspective. 
In the context of functional programming, the Curry-Howard isomorphism - relating 
natural deduction intuitionistic proofs and their normalization process to programs and 
their execution - is a leading idea. Proofs are effective transformations of several inputs 
(assumptions) into one output (conclusion), as it is apparent from the correspondence 
between implication and function space, and from the categorical interpretation of the 
intuitionistic natural deduction. 
In this perspective there is no real problem with linear logic (e.g. [ 1,4,7]) but for 
par, which has not received any attention from a natural deduction (i.e. input+utput) 
perspective. The reason seems to stay in the apparent impossibility to formulate a 
suitable introduction-elimination pair, when sticking to single conclusion systems. The 
problem obviously does not arise either in sequent calculus or in proof-nets, which 
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are intrinsically multiconclusion calculi. Note, moreover, that even in an intuitionistic 
setting (traditionally single-conclusion), the Full Intuitionistic Linear Logic (FILL) of 
[3], which is an input-output interpretation, is formulated as a multiconclusion sequent 
calculus. 
Semantically speaking, a par is a monoidal tensor. Thus, our strategy of investigation 
has been to isolate a simple ambience (the pure implicative fragment) and to enrich 
it stepwise, starting from the weakest possible connective (i.e. a covariant bihmctor; 
Section 2). The strengthening of this connective into an intuitionistic par allowed in- 
teresting reflections on the logical power of this “intuitionistic” system (Section 3). 
Indeed, from the simple formulation of the calculus and the logical equivalence with 
FILL, we see that this intuitionistic par is a restricted tensor (Section 3.2), leaving 
still open the problem of finding a convincing intuitionistic interpretation for par. It is 
not too surprising that in the classical case the par is amenable to a better treatment 
(Sections 4 and 5), resulting in a natural deduction system enjoying both proof- 
theoretically (explicit introduction-elimination rules for par) and computationally (nor- 
malization) good properties. 
2. Pre-tensorial inear logic 
All the systems we study in this paper are built on top of the implicational frag- 
ment of linear logic, formulated in natural deduction style according to the following 
definition. 
Definition 2.1. The pure implicative natural deduction system of linear logic (N-ill) is 
given by the following axioms and rules: 
A 
PI 
Here, and in the following, [B] means that exactly one occurrence of the formula B 
is discharged; as usual, other assumptions may be present. We write r t A, where r 
is a multiset of formulas, if there is a deduction of A whose open assumptions (each 
corresponding to a leaf) are exactly the formulas of r. 
Additional systems will be obtained adding to N-ill connectives and rules. We will 
use the notation LL~~st~of~comectives 
hst of rules to denote the natural linear deduction system obtained 
by adding to N-ill the new connectives in the “list-of-connectives” equipped with the 
rules in the “list-of-rules”. 
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We study, first, the simple system obtained by adding a binary connective l , with, 
as only rule, the following replacement rule (093): 
[Al LB1 
. . 
AoB C D 
CaD 
0 w 
A l B is the “major premise” of the rule, while C and D are its “minor premises”. 
We call the resulting system, LL:,, pre-tensorial inear logic (or PtLL). It is a 
very simple system, with good proof-theoretical properties (see Section 2.1), but very 
limited on the logical side. Indeed, from a categorical point of view, l is simply a 
bi-mnctor, without any “intrinsic” property. In particular: 
Proposition 2.2. The l is not commutative and is not associative. 
And, moreover, its rule is too weak to characterize completely the connective: 
Proposition 2.3. Let o be another connective with the same rule of l . Then 
It is a situation common to all “intensional” connectives, like the modalities, when 
their proof theory is formulated in the standard way. 
2.1. Reductions and properties 
We may equip system PtLL with a reduction relation on proofs, adding to the usual 
fi reductions for - the following b reduction: 
[Al WI 
[Al PI 
[Cl PI CC> CD) 
A.B C D i i D 
C*D E F AaB E F 
EoF EeF 
It is no surprise that under the reduction relation defined by this rule, PtLL enjoys 
good properties. 
Theorem 2.4. PtLL is strongly normalizing. 
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Proof. Define the size s(x) of a deduction rc whose last rule has premise rci (respec- 
tively, premises rcl, 7~2,713) as s(ni) + 1 (~(711) +s(Q) +s(rcs) + 1). Due to the linearity 
of the calculus, the size of the deduction strictly decreases in any reduction step. 0 
In spite of the impurity of rule l B (its premises behave as in an elimination rule, 
while its conclusion behaves as in an introduction rule), PtLL enjoys also the subfor- 
mula principle. We are not interested in the study of the subformula principle “per se”, 
but it is interesting in order to have a full understanding of the 09 rule. 
The usual notion of track has to be extended, in order to handle the nonstandard 
behavior of rule 09. 
Definition 2.5. A track of a derivation is a sequence of formulas As,. . . , A, such that 
(i) A0 is an assumption not discharged by an application of 092; 
(ii) Ai, for i < n, is not the minor premise of 4 8’ and either 
1. Ai is not the major premise of 0~2.2 and Ai+l is directly below Ai or 
2. Ai is the major premise of 092 and Ai+, is an assumption discharged at that 
rule; 
(iii) A, is either the minor premise of a 4 8, or the conclusion of the deduction. 
In the following theorem, whose proof is routine [6], note the double role played by 
the 09 rule: its major premise belongs to the E-part, while its minor premises belong 
to the I-part (or is the minimum formula). 
Theorem 2.6. Let 9 be a normal derivation and let ‘it = Ao, . . . ,A, be a track in 9. 
Then there is a formula A; which separates two (possibly empty) parts of rc (called 
the E-part and the I-part) such that: 
(i) for each Aj of the E-part: j < i, Aj is the major premise of an elimination rule 
or of ~3, and Aj+l is a subformula of Aj; 
(ii) Ai, for i # n, is a premise of an introduction rule, or a minor premise of a l W 
rule; 
(iii) for each Aj of the I-part: i < j, Aj is either a premise of an introduction rule, 
or a minor premise of a l W rule, and Aj is a subformula of Aj+l. 
Proof. Suppose the thesis is false. Then the proof is not normal. Argue by cases. 
Aj cannot be the premise of an introduction rule and Aj+l the major premise of an 
elimination, for normality; Aj cannot be the premise of an introduction rule and Aj+l 
the major premise of 09, for the main connective of Aj+l is not 0; Aj cannot be 
the minor premise of G% and Aj+l the major premise of an elimination, for the main 
connective of Aj+l is not 4; Aj cannot be the minor premise of ~2 and Aj+l the 
major premise of 09, for normality. 0 
Theorem 2.7. LL:, enjoys the subformula principle. 
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Proof. By induction on the order of a track (a track is of order 0 iff its last formula 
is the conclusion of the deduction, and is of order p + 1 if its conclusion is the minor 
premise of a --o elimination), show that any formula appearing in a track is subformula 
of the conclusion or of one undischarged hypothesis. 0 
2.2. Toward tensorial linear logic 
Theorem 2.6 suggests a way to strengthen PtLL, separating in two different rules the 
introduction and the elimination behavior of 052. Since a minor premise belongs to the 
I-part and is followed in a track by the conclusion of the rule, a suitable introduction 
rule is obtained simply, by taking as its premises the minor premises of l W and as 
conclusion the conclusion of the 42, namely 
C D 
C@D 
l Y 
Analogously, since the major premise of l %? belongs to the E-part and is followed in 
a track by one of the discharged assumptions, we may obtain an elimination rule by 
taking as its major premise the major premise of OS?, as discharged hypotheses the 
discharged hypotheses of 09, and as conclusion a “new” formula: 
AmB C 
c 
08 
Now, in these two rules we immediately recognize those for the linear connective 8. 
The logic LL:,,., coincides therefore with the tensorial fragment of LL, without the 
constant 1. We will then use @ for the connective l equipped with these two rules. It 
is obvious that the rule 42 is derived in LL:,,,,. 
3. Linear intuitionism? 
3.1. Good news 
Having obtained the tensorial logic LL$$,@,, we may now exploit the observation 
we made on the intensionality of a connective defined by the only rule l W and look 
what happens to the tensorial logic based on @ when we add a further (pre)tensor 
connective 0. We are thus interested in the system LL$$,.,,.,. 
The two connectives interact in a nice form, since 
LL ~~,~~,.w~BB(A.D)~(B~A).D. 
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This important weak distributivity property is at the heart of the interpretation of 
linear logic into categories. Cockett and Seely [2] show how it is necessary in or- 
der to model the cut rule in classical linear logic; DePaiva and Hyland [3] build 
over it an interesting system for an intuitionistic fragment of linear logic. Standard 
formulations of intuitionistic linear logic (e.g. [5]) stem from the usual syntactic re- 
striction (at most one formula to the right) of the two-sided sequent formulation of 
the classical version. Since the right rule for par does not make sense under this 
restriction, par has been banned from the intuitionistic fragment. Starting from the 
semantic intuition of a category with two monoidal operations connected by weak dis- 
tributivity, DePaiva and Hyland realized that an (intuitionistic) system with par was 
possible, in a multiconclusion setting and (for ensuring cut-elimination) with term 
annotations. They prove the calculus (FILL: Full Intuitionistic Linear Logic) com- 
plete with respect to fiIl multiplicative categories (i.e. symmetric monoidal closed 
categories which are weakly distributive), which are the “natural” models of 
FILL. 
What are, then, the relations between FILL and our LLg$ Bg .%, with l playing the 3 > 
role of intuitionistic par? To answer the question, let us first add to our system rules for 
the constants 1 and 1, plus rules for commutativity and associativity of l . As usual, 
we will write A’ for A - 1. The simplest rules for the constants are the naive ones: 
A A.-L 
~ 19 
A.l 
- J-b 
A 
A 1 
i 19 - 16 
A 
Commutativity and associativity are simply obtained by2 
A*(B*C) al 
(A.B).C 
(A.&.CaZ 
A.(B.C) 
Let N-FILL (= LL@“‘sl)l 639,@8, &?,comm,al,aZ, 19, II, If, 18 ) be the resulting system. 
Proof. (=+) Easy, since all the rules of N-FILL are clearly valid in FILL. 
(+) For a syntactic proof of this fact one needs first to decorate N-FILL proofs 
with terms and, then, to prove that each FILL term can be permuted in a suitable way 
* Proof theoretical purist: wait...! 
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to obtain an N-FILL term. The crucial point of this process is the treatment of the 
restriction on the right rule for 4. This syntactic proof, however, is long and tedious. 
We sketch, instead, an economical semantical proof. Note, first, that N-FILL contains 
all the ingredients to build a full multiplicative category, say NF. In order NF to be 
such a category, of course, one needs to add suitable quotients of arrows, for unicity 
and coherence, but these will not identify objects. Since FILL is complete for weakly 
distributive categories, any proof r k F,LL A corresponds to an arrow in NF, that is to 
a (quotient of proofs) r ~_N-FILL A. 0 
3.2. Bad news 
Unfortunately, as far as provability is concerned, N-FILL is not big improvement 
over pure tensorial logic. Define the following “collapsing” map ( )*: 
(I)* = 1, 
(A. B)* =(A)* @ (B)*, 
(A @B)* = (A)* @ (B)*, 
(A --o B)* = (A)* 4 (B)*. 
Theorem 3.2. If rc is a proof of r F N FILL A, then we can construct a proof 7c* of - 
(r)* EN-FILL (A)*. 
Proof. Easy induction on the length of n and by cases on its last rule. The only 
“interesting” cases are those involving the l connective: we will show only the one in 
which the last rule is l , as it shows how the bifunctorial rules must be replaced by a 
pair of @9 - @3& rules: 
By induction hypothesis and by using the ~3 and @& rules we have Fig. 1. 0 
The opposite implication obviously does not hold. For F = ((A l B) - C) --o (A --o 
(B - C)), k (F)*, but it is easy to show, in view of the cut-elimination theorem for 
FILL, that IfF. The logical laws on +,o,i are thus a subset (modulo renaming) of 
the laws on -,@, 1, a situation hardly satisfactory (Fig. 2). Consider, indeed, what 
happens for the (nonlinear) connectives “and”, “or”. When we go from their classical 
formulation to the intuitionistic one, we preserve a clean-cut separation between them 
_ they still have a common set of logical laws, but none of them is a subset of the 
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NA)*lY(~)* Kw*l?(v* 
co* :n* . 2 ;?I; 
in; to* CD)* 
64)’ @3(B)* (C)' @ (D)* ‘$ 
636 
Fig. 1. 
INTUITIONISTIC “and” INTUITIONlSTIC “or’ 
J 
CLASSICAL “and” 
\ 
CLASSICAL “or” 
INTUITIONISTIC “tensor” 
I 
INTUITIONISTIC “par’ 
* 
CLASSICAL “tensor” CLASSICAL “par” 
Fig. 2. Logical laws of “and”-“or”, “tensor’‘-“par”. 
other. In the linear case, instead, Theorem 3.2 tells us that the intuitionistic par is a 
restricted version of the tensor 8. 
The moral we draw from this section is that, despite the deep semantical motivation 
and the proof-theoretical interest of a system like FILL (whose cut-elimination depends 
in an essential way from the term annotations), it is difficult to call intuitionistic a 
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connective that is only a restricted tensor. The only fact that in this fragment A pAI 
it is not provable, seems too limited a reason. Due to the intensionality of its par, its 
status is somehow similar to that of many temporal logics, where different logics are 
characterized by connectives with increasing power. 
4. Toward classical linear logic 
If the natural deduction formulation shows that intuitionistic par is debatable, can we 
gain something passing to classical par? Let us look at ways to extend the pre-tensorial 
rule 
PI PI 
ApB C D 
CPD 
632 
in order to have a classical @. Since in MLL one can prove ApA’ (where, with a 
little abuse of language, in the case of A = 1, A’ may denote not only 1 41, but 
also I), let us start adding to LL~~~,~,~,,,,,,, the axiom 
From this and rule ~52, we obtain Fig. 3, which can be formulated as introduction 
rule: 
This (and its symmetric) is the “official” introduction 
the proof of A @AL. 
Fig. 3. 
rule for p, which trivially allows 
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WI 
ApB I PI 
-L @B 
B 
Fig. 4 
Let us start again this euristic game. In MLL, _L is the identity of @. In particular, 
we need a way of obtaining a proof of B, given a proof of B@ 1. 3 Assume then given 
the rule 
and combine it with ~98 to form Fig. 4. Once again, this inference can be formulated 
as an elimination rule: 
ApB I 
B fJ& 
This (and its symmetric) is the “official” elimination rule for @. Observe it is not 
independent of the others connectives: its premises contain, besides @, also 1. 
5. Classical MLL 
After the discussion of the last section, let N-ml1 be the system obtained by adding 
to LL%,@W,i, the following rules: 
l Introduction rules: 
PI [AlI [ALI [Al 
C D C D 
CBD 
639’ 
C@D 
M2 
where in the case of A = 1, AL may be either 1 +_L or 1. 
3 The reverse deduction is easily proved by 
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l Elimination rules: 
Ml [Al 
APB J- BpA I 
B 
@36’ 
B 
fJJb’ 
Proposition 5.1. The @W pre-tensorial rule is derivable in N-mll. 
Proof. See Fig. 5. 0 
The following proposition shows how the splitting of the pre-tensorial rule allows 
to recover commutativity and associativity. 
Proposition 5.2. The go connective of N-ml1 is commutative and associative. 
Proof. See Fig. 6. 0 
Theorem 5.3 
Proof. (+) All the N-MLL rules are sound in MLL. 
[Cl 
CPD 
D $29 
Fig. 5. 
APB [Cl 
(A@B)@C 
Fig. 6. 
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(e=) From Theorem 3.1 and the discussion of the previous section, if r ~-FILL A, then 
r k~-~[l A. On the other hand, it is an easy exercise to show that FILL+AgvI1 = MLL. 
Since k~-~l, A@A I, we conclude. q 
5. I. On the go introduction rule 
One of the novelties of our approach is the p introduction rule which, in the dis- 
charging of a “negated” formula, bears similarities with reductio ad absurdum rule 
(RAA) of classical logic. It is easy to see how RAA is “implemented” in N-mll: 
_L [Al 
ItJA [J-l 
A 
Note RAA is obtained with a restricted instance of @X, where the “non negated” 
discharged formula is an assumption. In fact, such a restriction preserves the logical 
power of N-mll. 
Proposition 5.4. There is an efSective transformation of a N-ml1 proof 71 in another 
N-ml1 proof IZ’, s. t. in 7~’ each occurrence of the rule ~9 is bound to the following 
“formats”: 
[ALI [ALI 
[A]; . B M 
A@ ‘MB 
Proof (sketch). Replace each occurrence 
[Al [A’1 
C D 
CPD 
of @,-O in rt, with Fig. 7. 0 
Hence, from the point of view of the pure provability power, the ~9 rules may be 
replaced with the new rules 
[A’1 [A11 
B B 
- - 
APB B@A 
which correspond to the definition of - in terms of @. 
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D P1l 
[Al I 
4~ -L [II 
A 
C [Dl 
C@D 
Fig. 7. 
6. Reductions 
Before defining the N-ml1 reduction, we introduce a new proof figure that we call 
“absorption” (Fig. 8). Such a figure cannot be reduced in N-mll. This is consistent 
with the linearity of the calculus, in particular with the constraint that all the open 
hypotheses of a deduction be “concrete” leaves of the proof tree. This form of implicit 
weakening (the other undischarged assumptions of the deduction of I from Al are 
present, though not necessary for the derivation of C) is coessential to a formalization 
of linear proofs as proof trees. 
We will write an absorption as 
[A11 [Al 
I c 
C 
d 
Remark. We have in fact four absorption figures, one for each combination of ~9’) 
goY* with @,6’, p&Y*. 
6.1. fl Reductions 
We have the usual /3 redexes originated by 4, @, 1 plus the new @ redexes. 
A go redex is a sequence @,9 - pb that does not belong to an absorption figure. We 
have four kind of redexes, one for each combination of @Y’, ~9~ with @b’, PO?*; 
we will give a specific case, the other are analogous (see Fig. 9). B@C is the principal 
formula of the redex. 
6.2. Commutative reductions 
The usual commutative contractions for @J and 1, formed by a @&’ (18) followed 
by an elimination rule. 
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[ALI 
[A11 [Al 
LB1 B [Al 
B C 
BPC 
PY2 1 
D i 
@@ 
I c 
Lx? 
C C 
Fig. 9. 
6.3. Normalization 
Let us denote with -+ the compatible closure of D, and with -M the transitive and 
reflexive closure of 4. The “degree” of a redex is the usual structural complexity of 
its principal formula. It is immediate to prove that: 
Proposition 6.1. The contractions previously dejined are correct in N-mll. 
Now we can formulate the normalization theorem: 
Theorem 6.2. The reduction relation it is normalizing. 
Proof. Completely standard (see [S]). We outline here the main idea. Define the 
degree, d(9), of a deduction 93 as the maximum of the degrees of the redexes in 
9. Set now ~(9) = (d(g),m), w h ere m is the sum of the lengths of redexes of de- 
gree d(9). By induction on ~(9) (under the lexicographic ordering) we prove that, 
selected a redex of maximal degree in 9, we can reduce ~(9). 0 
7. Conclusions 
We have proposed some new natural deduction systems for various versions of the 
par connective. These systems show that, contrary to most folklore, the classical natural 
deduction methods can indeed cope with par. 
Besides this genuine proof-theoretical interest, we are convinced that a deeper insight 
into a system can be gained only by looking at it from many different perspectives, 
each revealing properties that others hide. A good example of this situation is the 
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relation between optimal lambda-reduction and linear logic, which becomes apparent 
only in the proof-net formulation and can be only reconstructed a posteriori in the 
sequent calculus approach. 
Without being too optimistic, we believe the proposed systems may point out new 
computational interpretation, with a particular emphasis on concurrency. The shape of 
the classical introduction rule, in fact, may be seen as the definition of a concurrent 
composition operator with a syncronous communication (represented by the simultane- 
ous discharging of the two dual premises). 
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